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Abstract
The high-water mark provision in hedge fund managers’ compensation raises concerns
of investors, because they are worried about that fund managers would take unnecessarily
high risk in the fund investment. In this paper, we theoretically analyze the optimal
strategies for hedge fund managers who choose to maximize the expected power utility
from fees in both discrete-time and continuous-time models. The results show that
when approaching the fee payment date, hedge fund managers would take as much risk
as they are allowed to in the fund investment. However, if hedge fund managers are
given more time, they tend to be more conservative. In the continuous-time model, the
optimal allocation of the fund in the risky asset depends on market conditions, which
are measured by the state price density.
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1 Introduction
Hedge fund managers receive management fees and performance fees as the compensation
for managing the funds. A manager is paid performance fees when the fund exceeds the
previous highest value, which is referred to as the high-water mark. The common practice
for hedge fund manager’s fee structure is 1% - 2% of the fund’s assets as management fees
and 15% - 20% of the profit above the high-water mark [see Aragon and Nanda (2011)]. A
criticism about the high-water mark fee schedule is that the performance fee is akin to a call
option, of which the high-water mark is the strike price and the fund’s value is the underlying
asset [see Carhart et al. (2002)]. If the hedge fund’s value exceeds the high-water mark, the
manager earns performance fees. If not, the manager loses nothing. If the fund value follows
a geometric Brownian Motion, according to Black-Scholes model, the value of this call option
increases if the volatility of the fund increases, because the vega, which is the derivative of
the option value with respect to the volatility of the underlying asset, is always greater than 0
[see Hull (2015)]. Therefore, the fund manager who is paid by high-water mark fees tends to
increase the volatility of the fund in order to maximize the value from fees. Investors should
be concerned about this moral hazard introduced by the high-water mark fee contract, which
is against their interest.
Many researchers have investigated the relationship between the high-water mark fee
contract and fund managers’ risk taking. In Guasoni and Ob lo´j (2016), a fund manager with
constant investment opportunity for the fund aims to maximize the expected power utility
from fees in the long run. The manager’s optimal strategy is a Merton portfolio1 with an
effective risk aversion γ∗M , where γ
∗
M = α+ (1−α)γM , γM is the manager’s own risk aversion,
and 0 < α < 1 is the fraction of profit that the manager receives from high-water mark
provision. Thus, the risk taking of the fund is bounded. If the manager’s own risk aversion
γM < 1, the high-water mark fee contract will decrease the risk taking of the fund comparing
to the case when the manager is managing his own money, because the manager is more risk
averse (γ∗M > γM). On the contrary, if the manager’s risk aversion γM > 1, the risk taking is
increased (γ∗M < γM ). Therefore, the authors conclude that the high-water mark fee contract
does not necessarily lead to the moral hazard of excessively high risk.
While the research of Guasoni and Ob lo´j (2016) is based on the assumption that the fund
manager does not invest in the fund, and invests the fees in the risk-free asset, Guasoni and
1Merton portfolio is the allocation that investors choose for the risky assets if they are managing their
own money in order to maximize the expected power utility from personal wealth.
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Wang (2015) assumes a manager who invests both the fund and the private wealth, including
fees, in separate, but possibly correlated investment opportunities and wants to maximize
the expected power utility from private wealth. The results show that for both hedge fund
and mutual fund, the manager does not use the fund to hedge personal investment even
if the investment opportunities are correlated, which is referred to as portfolio separation.
The downside effect is the so called “attention separation”. The manager’s welfare is the
maximum of the welfare from fees and the welfare from private wealth. If the welfare comes
from fees in the long run, the manager will focus on the fund investment. If the fund can not
offer sufficiently attractive welfare, then the manager will neglect the fund and focus on the
private investment.
Since the previous results are all based on the assumption that the manager has a long
horizon, this paper is going further to discuss how the length of the planning horizon affects
the risk taking in the fund investment for a manager who is paid by the high-water mark
fees. We theoretically analyze of the optimal strategies for the fund manager who aims to
maximize the expected power utility from fees for discrete-time and continuous-time models.
The results show that show that for single period binomial tree model, the manager
invests in the risky assets as much as he is allowed to. For two period binomial tree model,
the manager does not necessarily invest as much as in the one period model. The manager
might be conservative at the initial date, because he does not wants to lose the opportunity of
earning fees in the latter period. In continuous-time model, the optimal strategy is determined
by the market conditions, which are measured by the state price density. In particular, as
the time approaches the fee payment date, if the investment opportunity is good, the fund
manger is more likely to expect fees. Since the fund manager is risk averse, he tends to be
conservative in the fund investment. However, if the investment opportunity is bad, the
manger tends to perform aggressively in order to earn fees.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following: section 2 discusses the single period
binomial tree model, section 3 discusses the two period binomial tree model, section 4
considers the continuous-time model and the conclusion is in section 5.
2
2 Single Period Binomial Tree Model
In this section, we assume there is only one period, and that the fund manager only invests
the fund in one stock and the money market account. At the end of the period, the stock
with initial price S0 either goes up to uS0 or goes down to dS0 with probability p and 1− p,
respectively, where the up factor u > 1 and the down factor d < 1. With initial fund value
F0, the fund asset at the end of the period is F1 = piF0
(
S1
S0
)
+ (1− pi)F0(1 + r), where S1
is the stock price at the end of the period, pi is the proportion that the fund invests in the
stock and r is the risk-free rate.
Given the high-water mark H0 at time 0, the total fee X, which is paid at the end of
the period, includes both the performance fee and the management fee. The performance
fee is the proportion α of the profit of the fund above the high-water mark, which is
α(F1 −H0)+. The management fee is proportion ϕ from the fund asset, which is ϕF1. Thus,
X = α(F1 −H0)+ + ϕF1. Let Xu be the fee at the end of the period if the stock price goes
up, and Xd be the fee if the stock price goes down. Then,
Xu =α(F1 −H0)+ + ϕF1
=αF0
(
pi(u− r − 1) + (1 + r)− H0
F0
)+
+ ϕF0 (pi(u− r − 1) + (1 + r)) . (1)
Xd =α(F1 −H0)+ + ϕF1
=αF0
(
pi(d− r − 1) + (1 + r)− H0
F0
)+
+ ϕF0 (pi(d− r − 1) + (1 + r)) . (2)
We are interested in the optimal strategy for the fund manager who wants to maximize the
expected power utility from fees (U(X) = X
1−γ
1−γ ) at the end of the period. γ is the coefficient
of the relative risk aversion.
To simplify the mathematical calculation, we assume the risk free rate r is 0, the fund
manager earns no management fee (ϕ = 0) and d = 1
u
. Therefore,
Xu =α(F1 −H0)+ = αF0
(
pi(u− 1) + 1− H0
F0
)+
. (3)
Xd =α(F1 −H0)+ = αF0
(
pi
(
1
u
− 1
)
+ 1− H0
F0
)+
. (4)
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The expected power utility from the fees is E[U(X)] = pX
1−γ
u
1−γ + (1− p)
X1−γd
1−γ .
The fund manager never wants the fund to go bankrupt. Thus, the fund value at the end of
the period is non-negative, which indicates F1 ≥ 0 holds. Therefore, both piF0u+(1−pi)F0 ≥ 0
and piF0
1
u
+(1−pi)F0 ≥ 0, which gives the non-bankruptcy constraint 11−u ≤ pi ≤ uu−1 . Letting
pi− = 1
1−u < 0 and pi
+ = u
u−1 > 0, the manager’s goal is maxpi−≤pi≤pi+
E[U(X)].
Theorem 2.1. Let Md =
1
u
+ 1− H0
F0
and Mu = u+ 1− H0F0 . In the one period binomial tree
model, if 0 < γ < 1, the optimal strategy pi∗ is a function of H0
F0
, where
pi∗
(
H0
F0
)
=

Any pi− ≤ pi ≤ pi+, if H0
F0
> u+ 1
pi+, if 1
u
+ 1 ≤ H0
F0
≤ u+ 1
pi−, if H0
F0
< 1
u
+ 1 and (1− p)(Md)1−γ ≥ p(Mu)1−γ
pi+, if H0
F0
< 1
u
+ 1 and (1− p)(Md)1−γ < p(Mu)1−γ.
(5)
The maximum expected power utility is
max
pi−≤pi≤pi+
E[U(X)] =

0, if H0
F0
> u+ 1
p (αF0Mu)
1−γ
1−γ , if
1
u
+ 1 ≤ H0
F0
≤ u+ 1
(1− p) (αF0Md)1−γ
1−γ , if
H0
F0
< 1
u
+ 1 and (1− p)(Md)1−γ ≥ p(Mu)1−γ
p (αF0Mu)
1−γ
1−γ , if
H0
F0
< 1
u
+ 1 and (1− p)(Md)1−γ < p(Mu)1−γ.
(6)
Proof. Let pi1 =
H0
F0
−1
d−1 =
H0
F0
−1
1
u
−1 ≤ 0, and pi2 =
H0
F0
−1
u−1 ≥ 0, because u > 1 and H0 ≥ F0.
(i) If pi > pi2, then Xu > 0 and Xd = 0, because Xu > αF0
(
H0
F0
−1
u−1 (u− 1) + 1− H0F0
)+
= 0,
Xd ≤ αF0
(
H0
F0
−1
u−1
(
1
u
− 1)+ 1− H0
F0
)+
= 0, and according to (4) , Xd ≥ 0. Therefore,
the expected power utility is pX
1−γ
u
1−γ .
(ii) If pi < pi1, then Xu = 0 and Xd > 0, because Xd > αF0
(
H0
F0
−1
1
u
−1
(
1
u
− 1)+ 1− H0
F0
)+
= 0,
Xu ≤ αF0
(
H0
F0
−1
1
u
−1 (u− 1) + 1− H0F0
)+
= 0, and according to (3), Xu ≥ 0. Therefore,
the expected power utility is (1− p)X
1−γ
d
1−γ .
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(iii) If pi1 ≤ pi ≤ pi2, thenXu = 0 andXd = 0, becauseXu ≤ αF0
(
H0
F0
−1
u−1 (u− 1) + 1− H0F0
)+
=
0, Xd ≤ αF0
(
H0
F0
−1
1
u
−1
(
1
u
− 1)+ 1− H0
F0
)+
= 0, and according to (3) and (4), Xu ≥ 0
and Xd ≥ 0. Therefore, the expected power utility is 0.
We consider the following cases of H0
F0
:
(i) If H0
F0
> u + 1, then pi1 < pi
− < pi+ < pi2, because pi1 < u1
u
−1 <
1
1−u = pi
− and
pi2 >
u
u−1 = pi
+. Then, for all pi− ≤ pi ≤ pi+, Xu = 0 and Xd = 0. Therefore, any
pi− ≤ pi ≤ pi+ is the optimal strategy and max
pi−≤pi≤pi+
E[U(X)] = 0.
(ii) If 1 + 1
u
≤ H0
F0
≤ u + 1, then pi1 < pi− < pi2 ≤ pi+, because pi1 ≤ u1
u
−1 <
1
1−u = pi
− and
pi2 ≤ uu−1 = pi+.
(a) If pi− ≤ pi < pi2, then Xu = 0 and Xd = 0. Therefore, E[U(X)] = 0 and ∂E[U(X)]∂pi = 0
for all pi− ≤ pi < pi2.
(b) If pi2 ≤ pi ≤ pi+, then Xu > 0 and Xd = 0. Therefore,
E[U(X)] = p
X1−γu
1− γ = p
(
αF0
(
pi(u− 1) + 1− H0
F0
))1−γ
1− γ , (7)
and
∂E[U(X)]
∂pi
= p
(
αF0
(
pi(u− 1) + 1− H0
F0
))−γ
αF0(u− 1) > 0 (8)
for all pi2 ≤ pi ≤ pi+.
Therefore, pi = pi+ reaches the maximum of the expected power utility, and
max
pi−≤pi≤pi+
E[U(X)] = p
X1−γu
1− γ = p
(
αF0
(
u+ 1− H0
F0
))1−γ
1− γ > 0. (9)
(iii) If H0
F0
< 1
u
+ 1, then pi− < pi1 < pi2 < pi+, because pi1 >
1
u
1
u
−1 =
1
1−u = pi
− and
pi2 <
1
u
u−1 <
u
u−1 = pi
+.
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(a) If pi− ≤ pi ≤ pi1, then Xu = 0 and Xd > 0. Therefore,
E[U(X)] = (1− p)X
1−γ
d
1− γ = (1− p)
(
αF0
(
pi
(
1
u
− 1)+ 1− H0
F0
))1−γ
1− γ , (10)
and
∂E[U(X)]
∂pi
= (1− p)
(
αF0
(
pi
(
1
u
− 1
)
+ 1− H0
F0
))−γ
αF0
(
1
u
− 1
)
< 0 (11)
for all pi− < pi ≤ pi1.
(b) If pi1 < pi ≤ pi2, then Xu = 0 and Xd = 0. According to the previous discussion,
max
pi1<pi≤pi2
E[U(X)] = 0 and ∂E[U(X)]
∂pi
= 0 for all pi1 < pi ≤ pi2.
(c) If pi2 < pi ≤ pi+, then Xu > 0 and Xd = 0. Therefore,
E[U(X)] = p
X1−γu
1− γ = p
(
αF0
(
pi(u− 1) + 1− H0
F0
))1−γ
1− γ , (12)
and
∂E[U(X)]
∂pi
= p
(
αF0
(
pi(u− 1) + 1− H0
F0
))−γ
αF0(u− 1) > 0 (13)
for all pi2 ≤ pi < pi+.
According to the discussion above, E[U(X)] reaches the maximum at either pi− or pi+.
E[U(X)]|pi=pi+ = p
(
αF0
(
u+ 1− H0
F0
))1−γ
1− γ . (14)
E[U(X)]|pi=pi− = (1− p)
(
αF0
(
1
u
+ 1− H0
F0
))1−γ
1− γ . (15)
Thus, if (1 − p)
(
1
u
+ 1− H0
F0
)1−γ
≥ p
(
u+ 1− H0
F0
)1−γ
, the expected utility reaches
its’ maximum at pi = pi− and max
pi−≤pi≤pi+
E[U(X)] = (1 − p)
(
αF0
(
1
u
+1−H0
F0
))1−γ
1−γ . If (1 −
p)
(
1
u
+ 1− H0
F0
)1−γ
< p
(
u+ 1− H0
F0
)1−γ
, the expected utility reaches it maximum at
6
pi = pi+ and max
pi−≤pi≤pi+
E[U(X)] = p
(
αF0
(
u+1−H0
F0
))1−γ
1−γ .
The intuition behind Theorem 2.1 is as follows. Based on the assumption of model
parameters, The manager earns positive fees if he buys a sufficient amount of the stock
(pi > pi2) and the stock price goes up. However, if the stock price goes down, the manager
earns no fees. If the manager sells a sufficient amount of the stock (pi < pi1), then he receives
positive fees if the stock price goes down. On the contrary, if the stock price goes up, the
manager earns no fees. Any other strategies lead to the fees being zero. Thus, even if the
marginal utility is +∞ at X = 0, the manager can never avoid such a situation.
If the high-water mark is low (H0
F0
< 1
u
+ 1), the fund manager compares the expected
utility out of buying and selling and bet as much as possible in the better case. If the
high-water mark is very high (H0
F0
> u+ 1), the fund has no chance to exceed the high-water
mark, which means the fund manager cannot get performance fees. Thus, any strategy works
the same. If the high-water mark is 1 + 1
u
< H0
F0
< u+ 1, the fund manager only earns fees if
the stock price goes up, so the manager buys in the risky asset as much as he is allowed to
and the optimal strategy is pi+.
In our model, we assume that 0 < γ < 1. Because if γ > 1, U(X) = X
1−γ
1−γ → −∞ if
X → 0+, while as shown in the proof of Theorem 2.1, X = 0 is always of positive probability.
Therefore, U(X) = −∞ and there is no optimal strategy. Hence, the optimization problem is
not well defined. To analyze the problem with γ > 1, the assumptions we made need to be
modified and either the a positive management fee or a positive risk-free rate should work.
If the management fee is positive, the fund manager always earns some fees regardless of
the performance and the fee is not 0 even if the manager earns no performance fees. If the
risk-free rate is positive, at the least if the high-water mark is low, there always exists a pi
(for example, pi = 0) such that Xu and Xd are both positive, and thus the expected power
utility is not −∞.
Theorem 2.1 indicates that in the single period binomial tree model, if the fund manager
receives only the performance fees at the end of the period and maximizes the expected power
utility from the fees, the optimal strategy for him is always to buy or to sell the maximum
amount allowed in the risky asset. However, if the high-water mark is too high, any strategy
delivers zero utility.
In the next section, we are going to discuss whether the above conclusion will change if
the fund manager is given a longer planning horizon.
7
3 Two Period Binomial Tree Model
In this section, we assume that the manager invests in the fund in a two period model, and
check if the manager still chooses the most risky allocation he is allowed if he is given a longer
horizon. To simplify the mathematical calculation, in addition to the assumptions in Section
2, we make the following assumptions: high water mark starts from the initial fund value
(H0 = F0), and the probability of the stock going up and down is equal (p =
1
2
).
Let pi0 and pi1 be the proportion of the fund invested in the stock in the first period and
the second period, respectively. Because of the non-bankruptcy assumption, the constraint
for pi0 and pi1 is pi
− ≤ pi0, pi1 ≤ pi+, where pi− = 11−u and pi+ = uu−1 . The fund manager
aims to maximize the expected power utility from performance fees in two periods, i.e, the
maximization problem is
max
pi−≤pi0,pi1≤pi+
E[U(X1) + U(X2)]. (16)
If the fund value at the end of the first period F1 and the high-water mark at the end of
the first period H1 are given, then the optimal strategy for the second period pi
∗
1 = pi
∗
(
H1
F1
)
,
where pi∗ is defined in Theorem 2.1. Since F1, X1 and H1 are functions of pi0, instead of
max
pi−≤pi0,pi1≤pi+
E[U(X1) + U(X2)], we consider the maximization problem max
pi−<pi0<pi+
E[B(pi0)] ,
where
B(pi0) = U(X1) + max
pi−<pi0<pi+
E [U(X2)|F1, H1] . (17)
We call E[B(pi0)] the semi-value function.
Theorem 3.1. In the two period binomial tree model,
E[B(pi0)] =

C
2
(
−W (pi0)u
)1−γ
+ C4 (u−N(pi0))1−γ , if 11−u ≤ pi0 < u1−u2
C
4 ((u+ 1)W (pi0) + u)
1−γ + C2
(
W (pi0)
u
)1−γ
+ C4 (u−N(pi0))1−γ , if u1−u2 ≤ pi0 ≤ 0
C
4 (u− 1+uu W (pi0))1−γ + C2W (pi0)1−γ + C4 (u(N(pi0) + 1))1−γ , if 0 < pi0 ≤ u
2
u2−1
C
2W (pi0)
1−γ + C4 ((N(pi0) + 1)u)
1−γ , if u
2
u2−1 < pi0 ≤ uu−1 ,
(18)
where C = (αF0)
1−γ
1−γ , W (pi0) = pi0(u− 1) and N(pi0) = (1− α)(u− 1)pi0.
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Proof. In the first period, we assume H0 = F0, 0 < α < 1, u > 1 and d =
1
u
< 1. Let F¯1u and
F¯1d be the fund value at t = 1 before the manager is paid by performance fees if the stock
price goes up or down in the first period respectively. Let F1u and F1d be the fund value at
t = 1 after the manager is paid by fees, if the stock price goes up or goes down in the first
period, respectively. Similarly, we define H1u, H1d, X1u and X1d for high-water mark H1 and
performance fees X1 at the end of the first period, respectively.
Notice that since p = 1
2
, the optimal pi∗1 = pi
∗
(
H1
F1
)
is never pi−, because 1
2
(
1
u
+ 1− H1
F1
)1−γ
<
1
2
(
u+ 1− H1
F1
)1−γ
always holds for H1
F1
< 1
u
+ 1 (see details in Theorem 2.1).
The values of F¯1, X1, F1 and H1 depend on the choice of pi0.
(a) If pi0 ≤ 0,
F¯1u =F0pi0(u− 1) + F0 ≤ F0 = H0.
F¯1d =F0pi0 (d− 1) + F0 ≥ F0 = H0. (19)
Therefore, X1u = 0, because F¯1u ≤ H0, and X1d = αF0pi0 (d− 1) ≥ 0 because F¯1d ≥ H0.
Hence, the fund value at t = 1 after the manager is paid by performance fees are
F1u = F0pi0(u− 1) + F0 ≤ F0 = H0.
F1d = F¯1d −X1d = (1− α)F0pi0(d− 1) + F0 ≥ F0 = H0. (20)
The high-water mark at the end of the first period is H1u = H0 = F0 and H1d = F1d,
respectively.
(b) If pi0 > 0,
F¯1u =F0pi0(u− 1) + F0 > F0 = H0.
F¯1d =F0pi0 (d− 1) + F0 < F0 = H0. (21)
Therefore, X1u = αF0pi0(u− 1) > 0 because F¯1u > H0, and X1d = 0 because F¯1d < H0.
Hence, the fund value at t = 1 after the manager is paid by performance fees are
F1u = F¯1u −X1u = (1− α)F0pi0(u− 1) + F0 > F0 = H0.
F1d = F¯1d = F0pi0 (d− 1) + F0 < F0 = H0. (22)
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The high-water mark at the end of the first period is H1u = F1u and H1d = H0 = F0,
respectively.
We discuss the following cases for pi0:
Case 1: 1
1−u ≤ pi0 < u1−u2 .
Because u
1−u2 < 0, according to (20),
(i) F1u = F0pi0(u − 1) + F0 < F0 u1−u2 (u − 1) + F0 < F0 = H0, X1u = 0 and H1u =
H0 = F0. Therefore,
H1u
F1u
= H0
F0pi0(u−1)+F0 >
1
u
1−u2 (u−1)+1
= u+ 1. According to the
first case in Theorem 2.1, any 1
1−u < pi1 <
u
u−1 is optimal. The maximum expected
power utility of X2 given
H1
F1
> u+ 1 is max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1F1 > u+ 1
]
= 0.
(ii) F1d = (1−α)F0pi0(d−1)+F0 > F0, X1d = αpi0F0(d−1) and H1d = F1d. Therefore,
H1d
F1d
= 1. pi1 =
u
u−1 is optimal, as is indicated by the fourth case of 2.1. The
maximum expected power utility of X2 given
H1
F1
= 1 is
max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
= 1
]
=
1
2
(αF1du)
1−γ
1− γ
=
1
2
(α((1− α)F0pi0(d− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
1− γ . (23)
Notice that at the end of the first period, H1u
F1u
> u+ 1 or H1d
F1d
= 1 if and only if S1
S0
= u
or S1
S0
= d, respectively. Therefore, if 1
1−u ≤ pi0 < u1−u2 ,
E[B(pi0)] =E
[
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
]]
=
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1u
F1u
> u+ 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= u
)
+
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1d
F1d
= 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= d
)
=(0)
1
2
+
(
(X1d)
1−γ
1− γ +
1
2
(αF1du)
1−γ
1− γ
)
1
2
=
1
2
(
(X1d)
1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
4
(
(αF1du)
1−γ
1− γ
)
=
1
2
(
(αpi0F0(d− 1))1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
4
(
(α((1− α)pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
1− γ
)
10
=(
αpi0F0
(
1
u
− 1))1−γ
2(1− γ) +
(αF0(u− (1− α)(u− 1)pi0))1−γ
4(1− γ) . (24)
Case 2: u
1−u2 ≤ pi0 ≤ 0.
According to (20),
(i) F1u = F0pi0(u − 1) + F0 ≤ F0, X1u = 0 and H1u = H0 = F0. Therefore,
H1u
F1u
= F0
F0pi0(u−1)+F0 . 1 ≤ H1uF1u ≤ 1 + u, because H0F0pi0(u−1)+F0 ≥ 10(u−1)+1 = 1
and H0
F0pi0(u−1)+F0 ≤ 1u
1−u2 (u−1)+1
= u+ 1. pi1 =
u
u−1 is optimal, as is indicated in the
second and the fourth case of Theorem 2.1. The maximum expected power utility
of X2 given 1 <
H1
F1
< u+ 1 is
max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|1 ≤ H1
F1
≤ u+ 1
]
=
1
2
(
αF1u
(
u+ 1− H0
F1u
))1−γ
1− γ
=
1
2
(α(F0pi0(u− 1) + F0)(u+ 1)− αH0)1−γ
1− γ .
(25)
(ii) F1d = (1 − α)F0pi0(d − 1) + F0 ≥ F0, X1d = αpi0F0(d − 1) ≥ 0 and H1d = F1d.
Therefore, H1d
F1d
= 1. pi1 =
u
u−1 is optimal, as is indicated by the fourth case of
Theorem 2.1. The maximum expected power utility of X2 given
H1
F1
= 1 is
max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
= 1
]
=
1
2
(αF1du)
1−γ
1− γ
=
1
2
(α((1− α)F0pi0(d− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
1− γ . (26)
Notice that at the end of the first period, 1 ≤ H1
F1
≤ u + 1 or H1
F1
= 1 if and only if
S1
S0
= u or S1
S0
= d, respectively. Therefore, if u
1−u2 ≤ pi0 ≤ 0,
E[B(pi0)] =E
[
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
]]
=
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|1 ≤ H1u
F1u
≤ u+ 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= u
)
+
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1d
F1d
= 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= d
)
11
=(
1
2
(αF1u(u+ 1− H0F1u ))1−γ
1− γ
)
1
2
+
(
(X1d)
1−γ
1− γ +
1
2
(αF1du)
1−γ
1− γ
)
1
2
=
1
4
(
(αF1u(u+ 1− H0F1u ))1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
2
(
(X1d)
1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
4
(
(αF1du)
1−γ
1− γ
)
=
1
4
(
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)− αH0)1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
2
(
(αpi0F0(d− 1))1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
4
(
(α((1− α)pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
1− γ
)
=
(αF0((u+ 1)(u− 1)pi0 + u))1−γ
4(1− γ) +
(
αpi0F0
(
1
u
− 1))1−γ
2(1− γ)
+
(αF0(u− (1− α)(u− 1)pi0))1−γ
4(1− γ) . (27)
Case 3: 0 < pi0 ≤ u2u2−1 .
According to (22),
(i) F1u = (1−α)F0pi0(u−1)+F0 > F0, X1u = αpi0F0(u−1) and H1u = F1u. Therefore,
H1
F1
= 1. pi1 =
u
u−1 is optimal, as is indicated by the fourth case of Theorem 2.1.
The maximum expected power utility of X2 given
H1u
F1u
= 1 is
max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
= 1
]
=
1
2
(αF1uu)
1−γ
1− γ
=
1
2
(α((1− α)F0pi0(u− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
1− γ . (28)
(ii) F1d = F0pi0(d − 1) + F0 < F0, X1d = 0 and H1d = H0 = F0. Therefore,
H1d
F1d
= F0
F0pi0(d−1)+F0 . 1 <
H1d
F1d
≤ u + 1, because H0
F0pi0(d−1)+F0 >
1
0(d−1)+1 = 1
and H0
F0pi0(d−1)+F0 ≤ 1( u2
u2−1 )(
1−u
u
)+1
= u+ 1. pi1 =
u
u−1 is optimal, as is indicated by
the second and the fourth case of Theorem 2.1. The maximum expected power
utility of X2 given 1 <
H1
F1
≤ u+ 1 is
max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|1 < H1
F1
≤ u+ 1
]
=
1
2
(
αF1d
(
u+ 1− H0
F1d
))1−γ
1− γ
=
1
2
(α(F0pi0(d− 1) + F0)(u+ 1)− αH0)1−γ
1− γ .
(29)
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Notice that at the end of the first period, H1
F1
= 1 or 1 < H1
F1
≤ u + 1 if and only if
S1
S0
= u or S1
S0
= d, respectively. Therefore, if 0 < pi0 ≤ u2u2−1 ,
E[B(pi0)] =E
[
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
]]
=
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|1 < H1d
F1d
≤ u+ 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= d
)
+
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1u
F1u
= 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= u
)
=
(
1
2
(αF1d(u+ 1− H0F1d ))1−γ
1− γ
)
1
2
+
(
(X1u)
1−γ
1− γ +
1
2
(αF1uu)
1−γ
1− γ
)
1
2
=
1
4
(
(αF1d(u+ 1− H0F1d ))1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
2
(
(X1u)
1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
4
(
(αF1uu)
1−γ
1− γ
)
=
1
4
(
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)− αH0)1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
2
(
(αpi0F0(u− 1))1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
4
(
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
1− γ
)
=
(
αF0
(
u+1
u
(1− u)pi0 + u
))1−γ
4(1− γ) +
(αpi0F0(u− 1))1−γ
2(1− γ)
+
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
4(1− γ) . (30)
Case 4: u
2
u2−1 < pi0 ≤ uu−1 .
Because u > 1, u
2
u2−1 > 0. Then, according to (22),
(i) F1u = (1 − α)F0pi0(u − 1) + F0 > F0, X1u = αpi0F0(u − 1) > 0 and H1u = F1u.
Therefore, H1u
F1u
= 1. pi1 =
u
u−1 is optimal, as is indicated by the fourth case of
Theorem 2.1. The maximum expected power utility of X2 given
H1
F1
= 1 is
max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
= 1
]
=
1
2
(αF1uu)
1−γ
1− γ
=
1
2
(α((1− α)F0pi0(u− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
1− γ . (31)
(ii) F1d = F0pi0(d − 1) + F0 < F0, X1d = 0 and H1d = H0 = F0. Therefore, H1dF1d =
H0
F0pi0(d−1)+F0 >
1
u2
u2−1 (
1−u
u
)+1
= u+ 1. Any 1
1−u < pi1 <
u
u−1 is optimal, as is indicated
by the first case of Theorem 2.1. The maximum expected power utility of X2 given
13
H1
F1
> u+ 1 is max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1F1 > u+ 1
]
= 0.
Notice that at the end of the first period, H1
F1
= 1 or H1
F1
> u+ 1 if and only if S1
S0
= u or
S1
S0
= d, respectively. Therefore, if u
2
u2−1 < pi0 ≤ uu−1 ,
E[B(pi0)] =E
[
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1
F1
]]
=
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1d
F1d
> u+ 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= d
)
+
(
U(X1) + max
pi−≤pi1≤pi+
E
[
U(X2)|H1u
F1u
= 1
])
P
(
S1
S0
= u
)
=(0)
1
2
+
(
(X1u)
1−γ
1− γ +
1
2
(αF1uu)
1−γ
1− γ
)
1
2
=
1
2
(
(X1u)
1−γ
1− γ
)
+
1
4
(
(αF1uu)
1−γ
1− γ
)
=
(αpi0F0(u− 1))1−γ
2(1− γ) +
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)1−γ
4(1− γ) . (32)
Hence, the expected semi-value function E[B(pi0)] is in (18). We are interested in the pi∗0
such that E[B(pi0)] reaches the maximum.
Corollary 3.2. In Theorem 3.1, there exists a pi∗c2 in (
u
1−u2 , 0) and a pi
∗
c3 in (0,
u2
u2−1)
such that ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi∗ci = 0, for i = 2, 3. The optimal strategy in the first period pi∗0 =
argmax{E[B(pi0)], pi0 ∈ {pi∗c2, pi∗c3, pi+}}.
Proof. We can directly calculate the first order derivative and second order derivative of
E[B(pi0)] with respect to pi0 for each case in Theorem 3.1.
(i) For case 1,
∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
=
1
2
(αpi0F0(d− 1))−γ(αF0(d− 1))
+
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)u)−γαu(1− α)F0(d− 1). (33)
∂2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
=− γ
2
(αpi0F0(d− 1))−γ−1(αF0(d− 1))2
14
− γ
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)u)−γ−1(αu(1− α)F0(d− 1))2. (34)
Therefore, ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
< 0 because d < 1. ∂
2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
< 0 because γ > 0.
(ii) For case 2,
∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
=
1
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ [α(u+ 1)F0(u− 1)]
+
1
2
(αpi0F0(d− 1))−γ(αF0(d− 1))
+
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)u)−γαu(1− α)F0(d− 1). (35)
∂2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
=− γ
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ−1 (α(u+ 1)F0(u− 1))2
− γ
2
(αpi0F0(d− 1))−γ−1(αF0(d− 1))2
− γ
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)u)−γ−1(αu(1− α)F0(d− 1))2. (36)
Therefore, ∂
2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
< 0.
(iii) For case 3,
∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
=
1
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ [α(u+ 1)F0(d− 1)]
+
1
2
(αpi0F0(u− 1))−γ(αF0(u− 1))
+
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)−γαu(1− α)F0(u− 1). (37)
∂2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
=− γ
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ−1 (α(u+ 1)F0(d− 1))2
− γ
2
(αpi0F0(u− 1))−γ−1(αF0(u− 1))2
− γ
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)−γ−1(αu(1− α)F0(u− 1))2. (38)
Therefore, ∂
2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
< 0.
(iv) For case 4,
∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
=
1
2
(αpi0F0(u− 1))−γ(αF0(u− 1))
+
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)−γαu(1− α)F0(u− 1). (39)
15
∂2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
=− γ
2
(αpi0F0(u− 1))−γ−1(αF0(u− 1))2
− γ
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)−γ−1(αu(1− α)F0(u− 1))2 (40)
Therefore, ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
> 0 and ∂
2E[B(pi0)]
∂pi20
< 0.
E[B(pi0)] is piecewise concave and continuous. Because ∂E[B(pi0)]∂pi0 < 0 in case 1, the maximum
of E[B(pi0)] in
[
1
1−u ,
u
1−u2
)
is achieved at pi− = 1
1−u . Similarly, because
∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
> 0 in case 4,
the maximum of E[B(pi0)] in
(
u2
u2−1 ,
u
u−1
]
is achieved at pi+ = u
u−1 . Next, consider the first
order derivative at the endpoints in case 2 and case 3.
In case 2, if pi0 → ( u1−u2 )+,
lim
pi0→( u
1−u2 )
+
1
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ [α(u+ 1)F0(u− 1)]→ +∞. (41)
lim
pi0→( u
1−u2 )
+
1
2
(
α
(
u
1− u2
)
F0(d− 1)
)−γ
(αF0(d− 1))
=
1
2
(
α
(
1
u+ 1
)
F0
)−γ
(αF0(d− 1)). (42)
lim
pi0→( u
1−u2 )
+
1
4
(
α((1− α) u
1− u2F0(d− 1) + F0)u
)−γ
αu(1− α)F0(d− 1)
=
1
4
(
α(1− α)u
u+ 1
F0 + F0u
)−γ
αu(1− α)F0(d− 1). (43)
Therefore, ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi0→( u
1−u2 )
+ → +∞.
If pi0 → 0−,
lim
pi0→0−
1
2
(αpi0F0(d− 1))−γ(αF0(d− 1))→ −∞. (44)
lim
pi0→0−
1
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ [α(u+ 1)F0(u− 1)]
=
1
4
(α(u+ 1)(F0 − αH0)−γ [αF0(u2 − 1)]. (45)
lim
pi0→0−
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)u)−γαu(1− α)F0(d− 1)
=
1
4
(αF0u)
−γαu(1− α)F0(d− 1). (46)
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Therefore, ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi0→0− → −∞.
In case 2, the second order derivative is always negative. Therefore, the first order
derivative is decreasing. Since ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi0→( u
1−u2 )
+ → +∞ and ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi0→0− → −∞, by
continuity, there must exist a pi∗c2 in
[
u
1−u2 , 0
]
such that ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi∗c2 = 0 and the maximum of
E[B(pi0)] in
[
u
1−u2 , 0
]
is achieved at pi∗c2.
In case 3, if pi0 → 0+,
lim
pi0→0+
1
2
(αpi0F0(u− 1))−γ(αF0(u− 1))→ +∞. (47)
lim
pi0→0+
1
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ [α(u+ 1)F0(d− 1)]
=
1
4
(α(u+ 1)F0 − αH0)−γ [α(u+ 1)F0(d− 1)]. (48)
lim
pi0→0+
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)−γαu(1− α)F0(u− 1)
=
1
4
(αF0u)
−γαu(1− α)F0(u− 1) (49)
Therefore, ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi0→0+ → +∞.
If pi0 → ( u2u2−1)−,
lim
pi0→( u2
u2−1 )
−
1
4
(α(u+ 1)(pi0F0(d− 1) + F0)− αH0)−γ [α(u+ 1)F0(d− 1)]→ −∞. (50)
lim
pi0→( u2
u2−1 )
−
1
2
(αpi0F0(u− 1))−γ(αF0(u− 1)) = 1
2
(
αF0u
u− 1)
−γ(αF0(u− 1)). (51)
lim
pi0→( u2
u2−1 )
−
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)−γαu(1− α)F0(u− 1)
=
1
4
(α((1− α)pi0F0(u− 1) + F0)u)−γ αu(1− α)F0(u− 1) (52)
Therefore, ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|
pi0→( u2
u2−1 )
− → −∞.
In case 3, the second order derivative is always negative. Therefore, the first order
derivative is decreasing. Since ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi0→0+ → +∞ and ∂E[B(pi0)]∂pi0 |pi0→( u2
u2−1 )
− → −∞, by
continuity, there must exist a pi∗c3 in
(
0, u
2
u2−1
]
such that ∂E[B(pi0)]
∂pi0
|pi∗c3 = 0 and the maximum of
E[B(pi0)] in
(
0, u
2
u2−1
]
is achieved at pi∗c3.
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To summarize, E[B(pi0)] must reach the maximum at one of the four points, pi−, pi∗c2, pi∗c3
or pi+.
By directly plunging in pi− and pi+,
E[B(pi−)] =
(
αF0
1
u
)1−γ
2(1− γ) +
(αF0(u+ 1− α))1−γ
4(1− γ) .
E[B(pi+)] =
(αF0u)
1−γ
2(1− γ) +
(αF0(u+ u
2(1− α)))1−γ
4(1− γ) . (53)
Therefore, E[B(pi−)] < E[B(pi+)] always. To maximize E[B(pi0)] over pi− ≤ pi0 ≤ pi+, the
optimal allocation pi∗0 is pi
∗
c2 , pi
∗
c3 or pi
+ depending on the value of E[B(pi0)] at these points.
The E[B(pi0)] is always positive, because 0 < γ < 1. By choosing different combinations
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Figure 1: Semi-value Function E[B(pi0)] with the Up Factor u, the
Risk Aversion γ and the Incentive Rate α
of parameters u, γ and α, the E[B(pi0)] over pi− ≤ pi0 ≤ pi+ is plotted as in Figure 1. For (a),
(b) and (d) in Figure 1, the fund manager invests as much as he is allowed in the risky asset.
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The optimal allocation is pi+. For (c), the optimal proportion of the fund invested in the
risky asset is less than pi+.
u, γ and α are the major determinants of pi∗0. By comparing E[B(pi∗c2)], E[B(pi∗c3)] and
E[B(pi+)], we get pi∗0 which leads to the largest E[B(pi0)]. Next, we analyze the sensitivity of
pi∗0 with respect to α and γ as in Figure 2.
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(a) pi∗0 for α from (0.05, 0.45)
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(b) pi∗0 for γ from (0.2, 0.9)
Figure 2: Sensitivity of pi∗0 with respect to the Incentive Rate α and
the Risk Aversion γ
In Figure 2(a), u = 2, γ = 0.7 and α ∈ (0.05, 0.45). If the fund manger is very risk averse,
for the most piratical α, as α increases, the fund manager becomes more aggressive even
though he does not invest in the most risky allocation pi+.
In Figure 2(b), u = 2, α = 0.2, and γ ∈ (0.2, 0.9). If γ is sufficiently large, the manager is
more conservative if he is more risk averse. However, if γ is small than certain threshold, the
manager invests in pi+.
In conclusion, in the two period binomial tree model, the fund manager does not simply
invest as much as he is allowed in the risky asset. In order to maximize the total expected
power utility from fees in two periods, the fund manager might be more conservative at the
very beginning because he does not want to lose the chance to earn high-water mark fees for
the latter period, in case of poor performance in the first period.
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4 Continuous-time Model
In this section, we consider the model in which the stock and the money market account are
traded continuously, and the fund manager aims to maximize the expected power utility from
fees at the terminal date T > 0. Our model is a simplification of that in He and Kou (2016),
and the results from our model are more explicit than theirs.
Assume a fund manager invests the fund in two assets, a risk free asset and a risky asset
with price dynamics:
dS0,t = rS0,tdt, S0,0 = S0.
dS1,t = uS1,tdt+ σS1,tdWt, S1,0 = S1. (54)
r ≥ 0 is the risk-free rate, u is the appreciation rate and σ is the volatility of the stock, which
are all constants. W is a standard Brownian motion and {Ft}t≥0 is the filtration generated
by W . Assume the manager invests pit of the total fund value in the risky asset, where pi is
integrable with respect to W . With initial value F0, the fund value follows the dynamics:
dFt = rFtdt+ pitFt[(u− r)dt+ σdWt]. (55)
Let k = u−r
σ
, and the state price density in this complete market be ξt = exp
[
−
(
r + k
2
2
)
t− kWt
]
,
0 ≤ t ≤ T .
The fund manager earns α proportion of the fund’s profit above its initial value as
performance fees. The manager’s performance fees at time T is
XT = θ(FT ) =
 0, FT < F0α(FT − F0), FT ≥ F0. (56)
The fund manager aims to maximize the expected power utility from the fees max
pi
E [U(θ(FT ))],
where U(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ .
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Lemma 4.1. The solution to max
x≥0
[U(θ(x))− yx] is
argmaxx≥0 [U(θ(x))− yx] =

F0 +
(
y
α1−γ
)− 1
γ , 0 < y < l
0 or 1
γ
F0, y = l
0, y > l,
(57)
where x∗ = 1
γ
F0 and l = α
1−γ
((
1
γ
− 1
)
F0
)−γ
.
Proof. Consider the maximization problem max
x≥0
[U(θ(x))− yx]. Let x∗ be the tangent point
on the curve U(θ(x)) and the tangent line goes across (0,0) and (x∗, U(θ(x))), which satisfies
the following equation:
U ′(θ(x∗))θ′(x∗)(x∗ − 0) = U(θ(x∗))− 0,
i.e. (α(x∗ − F0))−γα(x∗ − 0) = (α(x
∗ − F0))1−γ
1− γ . (58)
By calculation, x∗ = 1
γ
F0 and the slope of the tangent line is l = α
1−γ
((
1
γ
− 1
)
F0
)−γ
.
(i) If y > l, [U(θ(x))− yx] ≤ 0 always. In particular, at x = 0, U(θ(x))− yx = 0.
(ii) If y = l, [U(θ(x))− yx] ≤ 0 always. In particular, at x = 0 and x = x∗, U(θ(x))− yx =
0.
(iii) If 0 < y < l, ∂[U(θ(x))−yx]
x
= (α(x−F0))−γα− y. To maximize [U(θ(x))− yx] over x, let
(α(x− F0))−γα− y = 0. Therefore, x = F0 +
(
y
α1−γ
)− 1
γ reaches the maximum.
Therefore, the solution to argmaxx≥0 [U(θ(x))− yx] is
argmaxx≥0 [U(θ(x))− yx] =

F0 +
(
y
α1−γ
)− 1
γ , 0 < y < l
0 or 1
γ
F0, y = l
0, y > l.
(59)
Theorem 4.2. If the fund manager aims to maximize the expected power utility from fees in
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the continuous-time model, at time t, the optimal value of the fund F ∗t is
F ∗t =e
−r(T−t)F0
[
Φ(d1,t) +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
e−
1
2
d21,t+
1
2
d22,tΦ(d2,t)
]
. (60)
The optimal allocation of the fund in the risky asset pi∗t is
pi∗t =
k
σ
[
1
γ
+
F0
er(T−t)F ∗t
(
1
γk
√
T − tΦ
′(d1,t)− 1
γ
Φ(d1,t)
)]
, (61)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
d1,t =
lnv
∗
ξt
+
(
r − k2
2
)
(T − t)
k
√
T − t , d2,t = d1,t +
k
√
T − t
γ
, (62)
and v∗ is the unique solution to the equation:
e−rTΦ
(
lnv∗ +
(
r − 3
2
k2
)
T
k
√
T
)
+
(
1
γ
− 1
)
(v∗)
1
γ e
− γ−1
γ
(
k2
2γ
+r
)
T
Φ
(
lnv∗ + (r − 3γ−4
2γ
k2)T
k
√
T
)
= 1.
(63)
Proof. First consider the problem of max
FT≥0
E[U(θ(FT ))], where FT is FT -measurable and
E[ξTFT ] ≤ F0. We solve the maximization problem by Lagrange Multiplier:
max
FT≥0
E
[
U(θ(FT ))− l
v
ξTFT
]
+
l
v
F0, (64)
where v is the Lagrange multiplier and l is defined in Lemma 4.1. By maximizing the above
problem, E [U(θ(FT ))] is also maximized if E[ξTFT (v)] = F0 holds.
According to Lemma 4.1, the optimal solution F ∗T to maximization problem of
max
FT≥0
E
[
U(θ(FT ))− lvξTFT
]
is
F ∗T (v) =
[(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξT
v
)− 1
γ
)
1{ξT<v}
]
F0 +
[(
1
γ
)
1{ξT=v}
]
F0 + (0)1{ξT>v}
=
[(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξT
v
)− 1
γ
)
1{ξT<v}
]
F0, (65)
given that E[ξTF ∗T (v)] = F0, which is an equation in v.
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Notice that E[ξTF ∗T (v)] is continuous and non-decreasing in v. Since 0 < γ < 1, for v < 1,
ξTF
∗
T (v) = ξT
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξT
1
v
)− 1
γ
)
1{ξT<v}F0 ≤ ξT
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
(ξT )
− 1
γ
)
F0. (66)
Therefore, if v → 0, |ξTF ∗T (v)| is bounded by ξT
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
(ξT )
− 1
γ
)
F0.
Since E
[
ξT
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
(ξT )
− 1
γ
)
F0
]
< +∞, by the dominated convergence theorem,
lim
v→0
E [ξTF ∗T (v)] = E
[
lim
v→0
ξTF
∗
T (v)
]
→ 0. (67)
Since ξTF
∗
T (v) is non-negative, by the monotone convergence theorem,
lim
v→∞
E[ξTF ∗T (v)] = E
[
lim
v→∞
ξTF
∗
T (v)
]
→ +∞. (68)
Thus, there is a v∗ such that E[ξTF ∗T (v∗)] = F0 holds. Since
F0 = E[ξTF ∗T (v∗)]
= E
[
ξT
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξT
v∗
)− 1
γ
)
1{ξT≤v∗}F0
]
= E
[
ξT1{ξT≤v∗}F0
]
+
(
1
γ
− 1
)
(v∗)
1
γF0E
[
ξ
γ−1
γ
T 1{ξT≤v∗}
]
=
(
1
γ
− 1
)
(v∗)
1
γ e
− γ−1
γ
(
k2
2γ
+r
)
T
F0Φ
 lnv∗ +
(
r − 3γ−4
2γ
k2
)
T
k
√
T

+ e−rTF0Φ
(
lnv∗ +
(
r − 3
2
k2
)
T
k
√
T
)
, (69)
v∗ satisfies the equation
e−rTΦ
(
lnv∗ +
(
r − 3
2
k2
)
T
k
√
T
)
+
(
1
γ
− 1
)
(v∗)
1
γ e
− γ−1
γ
(
k2
2γ
+r
)
T
Φ
 lnv∗ +
(
r − 3γ−4
2γ
k2
)
T
k
√
T
 = 1.
(70)
Notice that in the general model in He and Kou (2016), they cannot find similar explicit
equation for v∗.
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F ∗T is the theoretical value of the fund at time T that the fund manager needs to achieve
if he aims to maximize the expected power utility from fees. Let F ∗t = ξ
−1
t E[ξTF ∗T |Ft].
Therefore,
F ∗t =ξ
−1
t E
[
ξT
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξT
v∗
)− 1
γ
)
1{ξT≤v∗}F0|Ft
]
=E
ξT
ξt
1 + (1
γ
− 1
)(
ξt
ξT
ξt
v∗
)− 1
γ
1{ξt ξTξt ≤v∗}F0|Ft
 . (71)
Since Z = ξT
ξt
= e−(r+
1
2
k2)−k(WT−Wt) is independent of Ft, and ξt is known at time t, F ∗t =
f(t, ξt), where
f(t, ξ) =E
[
Z
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξZ
v∗
)− 1
γ
)
1{ξ≤v∗}F0
]
=E
[
Z
(
1 +
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξ
v∗
)− 1
γ
(Z)−
1
γ
)
1{Z≤ v∗
ξ
}F0
]
=F0E
[
Z1{Z≤ v∗
ξ
}
]
+ F0
(
1
γ
− 1
)(
ξ
v∗
)− 1
γ
E
[
Z1−
1
γ1{Z≤ v∗
ξ
}
]
, (72)
and lnZ ∼ N (−(r + 1
2
k2)(T − t), T − t). Let y = − 1
k
(
r + k
2
2
)
(T − t)− 1
k
lnZ, which follows
N (0, T − t).
If 0 < Z < v
∗
ξ
, then − 1
k
(
r + k
2
2
)
(T − t)− 1
k
lnv
∗
ξ
< y < +∞. Thus,
E
[
Z1{Z< v∗
ξ
}
]
=
∫ +∞
− 1
k
(
r+ k
2
2
)
(T−t)− 1
k
ln v
∗
ξ
1√
2pi(T − t)e
− y2
2(T−t) e−(r+
1
2
k2)(T−t)−kydy
=
∫ +∞
− 1
k
(
r+ k
2
2
)
(T−t)− 1
k
ln v
∗
ξ
1√
2pi(T − t)e
− (y+(T−t)k)2
2(T−t) e−r(T−t)dy (73)
=e−r(T−t)
1− Φ
− 1k
(
r + k
2
2
)
(T − t)− 1
k
lnv
∗
ξ
+ k(T − t)
√
T − t
 (74)
=e−r(T−t)Φ
(
lnv
∗
ξ
+ (r − k2
2
)(T − t)
k
√
T − t
)
, (75)
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and
E
[
Z1−
1
γ1{Z≤ v∗
ξ
}
]
=
∫ +∞
− 1
k
(
r+ k
2
2
)
(T−t)− 1
k
ln v
∗
ξ
e
1−γ
γ
(
r+ k
2
2
)
(T−t)+ 1−γ
γ
ky 1√
2pi(T − t)e
− y2
2(T−t)dy
=
∫ +∞
− 1
k
(
r+ k
2
2
)
(T−t)− 1
k
ln v
∗
ξ
1√
2pi(T − t)e
−(
y+
(γ−1)(T−t)k
γ )
2
2(T−t) e−
γ−1
γ (r+
1
2γ
k2)(T−t)dy
=e−
γ−1
γ (r+
1
2γ
k2)(T−t)
1− Φ
− 1k
(
r + k
2
2
)
(T − t)− 1
k
lnv
∗
ξ
+ γ−1
γ
(T − t)k
√
T − t

=e−
γ−1
γ (r+
1
2γ
k2)(T−t)Φ
(
lnv
∗
ξ
+ (r − k2
2
)(T − t)
k
√
T − t +
k
√
T − t
γ
)
. (76)
Therefore,
F ∗t = f(t, ξt) = e
−r(T−t)F0
[
Φ(d1,t) +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
e−
1
2
d21,t+
1
2
d22,tΦ(d2,t)
]
, (77)
where
d1,t =
lnv
∗
ξt
+ (r − k2
2
)(T − t)
k
√
T − t , and d2,t = d1,t +
k
√
T − t
γ
. (78)
Next, the goal is to construct a strategy in the fund such that the fund replicates F ∗T at time
T. The dynamics of d(ξtf(t, ξt)) is
d(ξtf(t, ξt)) =ξtd(f(t, ξt)) + f(t, ξt)dξt + dξtd(f(t, ξt))
=ξt
(
∂f(t, ξt)
∂t
dt+
∂f(t, ξt)
∂ξ
dξt +
1
2
∂2f(t, ξt)
∂ξ2
(dξt)
2
)
+ f(t, ξt)dξt
+
(
∂f(t, ξt)
∂t
dt+
∂f(t, ξt)
∂ξ
dξt +
1
2
∂2f(t, ξt)
∂ξ2
(dξt)
2
)
dξt
=ξtGtdt−
(
ξt
∂f(t, ξt)
∂ξ
+ f(t, ξt)
)
kξtdWt
=ξtGtdt−
(
kξt
∂f(t, ξt)
∂ξ
1
f(t, ξt)
+ k
)
ξtf(t, ξt)dWt (79)
where dξt = −rξtdt−kξtdWt. Notice that ξtf(t, ξt) is a martingale, because E [ξtf(t, ξt)|Fs] =
E [E [ξTF ∗T |Ft] |Fs] = ξsf(s, ξs) for s < t. Therefore, Gt = 0.
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On the other hand, for every strategy pi ot the fund, the fund follows the dynamics
dFt = rFtdt+ pitFt((u− r)dt+ σdWt) = rFtdt+ pitFtσ(kdt+ dWt), (80)
d(ξtFt) =ξtdFt + Ftdξt + dξtdFt
=rξtFtdt+ pitξtFtσ(kdt+ dWt)− rξtFtdt− kξtFtdWt − kξtpitFtσdt
=(pitσ − k)ξtFtdWt. (81)
We choose the pi∗t such that pi
∗
t σ−k = −kξt ∂f(t,ξt)∂ξ 1f(t,ξt)−k. For the corresponding ξtf(t, ξt)
and ξtFt, the dynamics of ξtf(t, ξt) is the same as ξtFt. Because ξtf(t, ξt) and ξtFt have
the same initial value ξ0f(0, ξ0) = E[ξTF ∗T ] = F0, FT = F ∗T . Thus, the optimal investment
strategy for the fund is
pi∗t =−
kξt
σF ∗t
∂f(t, ξt)
∂ξ
=− kξt
σF ∗t
e−r(T−t)F0
[
Φ′(d1,t)
ξ∗t
v∗
1
k
√
T − t(−
v∗
ξ2t
)−
(
1
γ
− 1
)
Φ′(d1,t)
Φ′(d2,t)
(
ξ∗t
v∗
)−1
1
v∗
Φ(d2,t)
+(
1
γ
− 1)Φ
′(d1,t)
Φ′(d2,t)
Φ′(d2,t)
ξ∗t
v∗
1
k
√
T − t(−
v∗
ξ2t
)
]
=
kξt
σF ∗t
e−r(T−t)F0
[
1
ξtkγ
√
T − tΦ
′(d1,t) +
γ − 1
γ2
1
ξt
Φ′(d1,t)
Φ′(d2,t)
Φ(d2,t)
]
=
k
σ
F0
er(T−t)F ∗t
 1
γk
√
T − tΦ
′(d1,t) +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
γ
Φ′(d1,t)
Φ′(d2,t)
Φ(d2,t)

=
k
σ
F0
er(T−t)F ∗t
[
1
γk
√
T − tΦ
′(d1,t) +
1
γ
(
f(t, ξt)e
r(T−t)
F0
− Φ(d1,t)
)]
=
k
σ
[
1
γ
+
F0
er(T−t)F ∗t
(
1
γk
√
T − tΦ
′(d1,t)− 1
γ
Φ(d1,t)
)]
=
k
σ
[
1
γ
+
F0
er(T−t)F ∗t
(
1
γk
√
T − tΦ
′(d1,t)− 1
γ
Φ(d1,t)
)]
. (82)
In continuous-time model, the optimal allocation in the risk asset pi∗t and the optimal fund
value F ∗t are determined by market conditions, which is measured by the state price density
ξt. Intuitively, if ξt is large, in order to earn the same amount money at time t, it requires
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more money at the initial time. Therefore, the market condition is bad if ξt is large. On the
contrary, the market condition is good if ξt is small. From Theorem 4.2, the optimal fund
value F ∗t increases if the market condition becomes better. Next, we analyze the relationship
of pi∗t and ξt with a graph. In Figure 3, let T = 1, r = 0.03, u = 0.08, γ = 0.8, σ = 0.3, t = 0.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
ξt
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
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t∗
Figure 3: pi∗t with respect to the Price Density ξt
and ξt ∈ (0, 0.9). v∗ can be calculated numerically according to (63). The optimal allocation
pi∗t is decreasing with ξt until ξt reaches 0.67, and increasing with ξt for ξt greater than 0.67.
If the market condition is bad (ξt > 0.67), the fund manager tends to be aggressive in the
fund investment in order to get fees. If the market condition is good, the manager does not
invest much in the risky asset, because he is risk averse.
Finally we discuss the property of pi∗t as t→ T . If ξt < v∗, d1,t → +∞ and d2,t → +∞,
because
ln v
∗
ξt
k
√
T−t → +∞,
(r− 1
2
k2)
√
T−t
k
→ 0 and k
√
T−t
γ
→ 0. Therefore, Φ′(d1,t)→ 0, Φ(d1,t)→ 1
and pi∗t → kσ
[
1
γ
+ F0
e
r(T−t)F∗
T
(− 1
γ
)
]
.
Similarly, if ξt > v∗, d1,t → −∞ and d2,t → −∞. Thus, Φ′(d1,t) → 0, Φ(d1,t) → 0 and
pi∗t → kσγ . Therefore, pi∗t is smaller if ξt < v∗ comparing with the pi∗t if ξt > v∗. If the market
condition is relatively bad, the fund manager tends to take more risk comparing with the
case that the market condition is good.
To summarize, in the continuous-time model, the fund manager does not take extreme
risk as in the one period binomial tree model. The allocation in the risky asset dynamically
changes and depends on the market condition. If the market condition is good, the fund
manager tends to take less risk, and vice versa. Thus, the moral hazard of unnecessarily high
risk does not always arise.
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5 Conclusion
The high-water mark fee is an important component of the hedge fund’s managerial contract.
There are concerns that the high-water mark fee structure might lead to moral hazard: the
fund manager takes unnecessarily high risks in order to earn more fees, which is against
the interest of the investors’. Many researchers show that fund managers do not necessarily
increase risk under a high-water mark contract both theoretically and empirically. However,
most of the previous research is based on the assumption that the hedge fund managers who
earn cumulative fees have a long planning horizon, while in reality, the hedge fund managers’
horizon is rarely infinite.
In this paper, the theoretical optimal strategies for the fund manager who chooses to
maximize the expected power utility from fees are given in both discrete-time and continuous-
time models. In the single period binomial tree model, the fund manager always invests as
much as he is allowed in the risky assets, unless the high-water mark is too high so that the
manager does not receive performance fees by any investment strategy. In the two period
binomial tree model, even though the optimal strategy for the second period is the same as
in the one period model, the fund manager does not necessarily invest in the most in the first
period. The manager tends to be conservative at the initial date because he does not want to
lose the opportunity to earn performance fee in the latter period. In general, the optimal
allocation in the first period pi∗0 is deceasing with γ and increasing with α, and it is more
sensitive to γ.
In the continuous-time model, the optimal investment strategy and the optimal fund value
are determined by market conditions, which are measured by the state price density ξt. If
the market condition is good, the fund manager tends to be more conservative because he is
more likely to expect fees. On the contrary, if the market condition is bad, the fund manager
tends to preform aggressively in order to earn fees. Thus, the moral hazard of unnecessarily
high risk does not always arise.
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